Who recognises Palestine, and who has done anything about it
Two views of the same 193 states. The first is recognition: 157 of 193 United Nations member states recognise the State of Palestine, most of them within weeks of the Algiers declaration of 15 November 1988. The second is conduct — which states have restricted arms transfers, sanctioned officials, settlers or settlement goods, or filed at the International Court of Justice. Recognition is a statement. The second map is the ledger of acts.
Recognition of the State of Palestine, by date of recognition
Hover any country for the date. Two recognitions are contested and are marked as such in the tooltip; territories on neither list are left blank rather than counted as refusals. The base map is Natural Earth, a cartographic base and not an adjudication of any boundary. Dates from Wikipedia, "International recognition of Palestine", retrieved 12 September 2026, which cites the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs list and the underlying UN documents for each entry. Dates are as given there.
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What each state has actually done
Strongest measure shown where a state has taken more than one; the tooltip lists them all. A declaration of intervention under Article 63 of the ICJ Statute concerns the construction of the Genocide Convention and is not, in itself, support for either party — the United States and Hungary filed alongside Namibia, Fiji, the Netherlands and Iceland in March 2026. Grey is not neutrality: it is the absence of any measure on the record.
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Recognition and public opinion
Recognition of Palestine, and the gap that has opened between Western publics and their governments.
Public opinion has moved ahead of government policy
YouGov for Caabu, 2–3 July 2026, n=2,125 GB adults · Pew Research (April 2026); Gallup (February 2026)
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International recognition of Palestine
Among the G20, 14 of 19 member states recognise Palestine.
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States that have taken a restrictive measure
A state joins the line on the date of its first measure and never joins it twice, so the step counts states rather than the weight of what they did. It is a floor: the 9 states that severed or downgraded relations are not on it, because the record names them without dating each rupture.
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- A state is counted once, on the date of its first measure; later measures by the same state do not raise the line.
- The line counts states, not the weight of what they did: a full arms ban and a travel ban on two ministers each move it by one.
- Undated ruptures and the ICC obligation are excluded from the step for the reasons given above, which means the line understates the number of states that have acted.
One arsenal is tolerated; the other does not exist
One state in the region holds an undeclared arsenal, refuses inspection and is outside the treaty. The other is inside the treaty, inspected, sanctioned, and was bombed. Set side by side, the double standard is not an argument but a table.
The nuclear exception
Six rows of the non-proliferation regime, two states. Red is outside the regime and unconstrained; blue is inside it and constrained. The cell text is the answer itself, so the matrix reads as a table and hovers as a source.
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Mordechai Vanunu
Published photographic evidence of the programme in The Sunday Times on 5 October 1986. Kidnapped by Mossad in Rome on 30 September 1986, convicted of treason and espionage, sentenced to 18 years, 11 of them in solitary confinement. Restrictions on his movement and speech remain partially in force in 2026.
- Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity was secured by a 1969 agreement between Richard Nixon and Golda Meir: the United States would stop pressing Israel to sign the NPT, in exchange for Israel not testing or acknowledging the arsenal.
- The row marked 'not stated in this record' is left blank rather than filled from outside the report.
Who gets named, which words are used, and who still believes it
The institutions that would not print the word while the events were happening have lost the audiences who watched the same events on their phones.
Palestinian casualties reported without naming Israel
The same events, two newsrooms. Novara Media’s April 2026 comparison of BBC and Al Jazeera reporting.
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Trust in the news, and news avoidance
Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2026, published 16 June 2026, surveying nearly 100,000 people across 48 markets.
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The same events, two vocabularies
Blue is the vocabulary used for Israeli deaths and Israeli officials; red is the vocabulary used for Palestinian ones. Counts from the Centre for Media Monitoring across a full year of coverage.
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- The word counts are the Centre for Media Monitoring's, across a full year of coverage; 'massacre' was applied to Israeli casualties 18 times more often than to Palestinian ones.
- Media Bias Meter's 'Framing Gaza' study analysed 54,449 articles across eight Western outlets over 100 weeks and found the same asymmetry in framing and word choice.
- The failure is not only framing: in 2024 The Jewish Chronicle published fabricated stories by a freelancer using the byline 'Elon Perry', retracted the material, and lost four columnists — Jonathan Freedland, David Aaronovitch, Hadley Freeman and David Baddiel — who resigned over its handling.
Antisemitic incidents, and the causal claim tested
The claim that British measures on Israel and Palestine cause antisemitic violence in Britain, set against the monitoring series and the government’s own comparative funding decisions.
Antisemitic incidents in the UK, and what the series tracks
CST, Antisemitic Incidents Report 2025 (11 February 2026)
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What the series shows
| Monthly average, Year before 7 October 2023 | 154 |
| Monthly average, 2025 | 308 |
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- For the first time, CST recorded more than 200 incidents in every calendar month of 2025.
- Before October 2023, monthly totals above 200 had occurred only five times, “each coinciding with past periods when Israel was at war” (CST).
- Worst month of 2025: October, 463 incidents.
- A further 3,001 reports in 2025 were assessed by CST and excluded as not antisemitic, a category CST describes as including “anti-Israel activity without antisemitic language, motivation or targeting”.
Home Office protective security for faith sites, 2026/27
Home Office, “Record funding to protect faith communities”, 19 February 2026
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Delivery, not just allocation
- 45% of recorded religious hate crimes in the 2025 England and Wales figures targeted Muslims.
- Of 510 mosque applications received between 1 July 2024 and 3 November 2025, 199 were approved, 311 remained pending and none was formally rejected (disclosed August 2026 after an Information Commissioner’s Office ruling).
- Dr Naomi Green, deputy secretary general of the Muslim Council of Britain: “this scheme is not fit for purpose”.
Two monitored series, one axis
Blue is the antisemitic incident count Britain discusses; green is the anti-Muslim incident count it does not. Tell MAMA publishes an annual report rather than a continuous series, so most years carry no bar, and the 2022 bar is drawn dashed because it is derived from the published two-year rise rather than published in its own right.
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The other series
| Rise in street-based threatening behaviour recorded by Tell MAMA | 715% |
| Rise in attacks on visibly Muslim individuals | 103% |
| Racially or religiously aggravated offences in August 2024 | 10,097 |
| Anti-Muslim incidents reported to police | 12.5% |
| Muslims as a share of religious-hate-crime victims | 44% |
| Muslim share of the population of England and Wales | ~7% |
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Tell MAMA publishes an annual report rather than a continuous series, and the record carries only the 2024 total of 6,313 — the highest since the organisation was founded — together with its statement that this was a 165 per cent rise over two years. The 2022 bar is that statement solved backwards, and is drawn dashed for that reason.
- CST's own analysis attributes the incident pattern to Israeli military action rather than to British policy: before October 2023 monthly totals above 200 had occurred only five times, 'each coinciding with past periods when Israel was at war', and the record annual total of 4,298 in 2023 preceded British recognition of Palestine by two years.
- The Home Office's February 2026 protective-security settlement allocated up to £40 million to mosques, £28.4 million to the Jewish community grant administered by CST — later raised to £32.4 million — and £5 million to all other faiths. Of 510 mosque applications received between 1 July 2024 and 3 November 2025, 199 had been approved, 311 remained pending, and none had been rejected.
- 45.3 per cent of Muslim women report feeling unsafe on public transport, against an 8 per cent national average.
The definition, the declaration and the law
Three documents claim to define antisemitism, fifty-nine Jewish organisations have declared anti-Zionism to be an instance of it, and one appellate court has decided the question the other way. The dashboard holds all four records because the report does.
Anti-Zionism, as manifested today through efforts to deny the Jewish people their right to self-determination, or demand that Jews renounce Zionism as the price of acceptance in political, academic, professional, or cultural life, is antisemitic. The J50 Declaration on Zionism and Antisemitism, Jerusalem, 11 September 2026. Closing line: “Zionism is part of Jewish identity. We will not allow others to define it for us.”
Where the signatory organisations are
Shade is the number of signatory bodies in a country, not a population or a share of opinion. Hover a country to read every body it signed through.
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Who signed it
| Global and regional organisations | 7 |
| National and community organisations | 52 |
| Countries | 40 |
| Signatories in total | 59 |
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- Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations
- Anti-Defamation League, ADL
- American Jewish Committee, AJC
- B'nai B'rith International
- World Jewish Congress
- European Jewish Congress, EJC
- Conference of European Rabbis, CER
The J50 Forum. Established by Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar in May 2025 and convened by Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Its third meeting was held in Jerusalem on 1 September 2026, chaired by William Daroff of the Conference of Presidents, with 59 senior representatives present; the agenda included “attempts to impose sanctions on Israel”. Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs; JNS, 1 September 2026
- Seven global and regional organisations signed, together with fifty-two national and community organisations across forty countries: fifty-nine signatories in total, the same number as the representatives at the forum of 1 September 2026.
- The declaration reaffirms the IHRA working definition but reproduces neither of its two limiting clauses: that an example counts only “depending on the overall context”, and that “criticism of Israel similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic”.
- Two of the signatories, the Board of Deputies of British Jews and the Jewish Leadership Council, are British; the legal record below is the law of their jurisdiction.
- A text declaring that Jews “will not allow others to define” Zionism was drafted through a forum established and hosted by a state’s foreign ministry.
Three definitions, and what each holds
IHRA Working Definition of Antisemitism
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance plenary, Bucharest
A non-legally-binding working definition with eleven illustrative examples, seven of which concern Israel. Two clauses limit them: an example counts only “depending on the overall context”, and criticism of Israel “similar to that levelled against any other country cannot be regarded as antisemitic”.
Adopted or endorsed by some 29 states and by both major British parties.
Its lead drafter, Kenneth Stern, has testified against its use as a campus speech code, telling the US Senate Judiciary Committee on 17 September 2024 that it was written to help data collectors, not to police speech.
Jerusalem Declaration on Antisemitism
Van Leer Jerusalem Institute; some 200 scholars of antisemitism, Jewish studies and Holocaust history
A core definition plus fifteen guidelines. Criticism of Zionism as a form of nationalism, and support for boycott, divestment and sanctions, are “not, in and of themselves, antisemitic”; evidence of antisemitism must be shown, not presumed from the target.
Used by universities and unions as an alternative or supplement to IHRA.
Drafted expressly as a corrective to the IHRA examples that its signatories judged too vague to apply consistently.
Nexus Document
A thirteen-member task force convened by the Center for the Study of Hate at Bard College, Kenneth Stern’s centre
It is antisemitic to oppose the existence of Israel “solely because it is a Jewish state”; but “paying disproportionate attention to Israel and treating Israel differently than other countries is not prima facie proof of antisemitism”.
Cited in US policy debate; adopted by no state.
Written by the institutional home of the IHRA definition’s own lead drafter.
What has actually been decided, in the jurisdiction of two of the signatories
University of Bristol v Dr David Miller
Employment Appeal Tribunal · [2026] EAT 84 (EA-2024-000324-RS)
Eight of the university’s nine grounds of appeal were rejected. The Bristol employment tribunal’s decision of 6 February 2024 stands: Miller’s anti-Zionist belief satisfies the Grainger criteria and is a protected philosophical belief under s. 10 of the Equality Act 2010, and his dismissal for manifesting it was direct discrimination under s. 13.
Lord Fairley KC presiding, with Nick Aziz and Dr Gillian Smith MBE. The protected belief was the bounded formulation Miller advanced, not anti-Zionism at large; Jonathan Turner of UK Lawyers for Israel, for the intervener, noted that the judgment “does not mean that all manifestations of anti-Zionism are protected”. Miller’s compensation was reduced by 50 per cent for contributory conduct.
Fraser v University and College Union
Employment Tribunal · [2013] ET/2203390/2011
The claim that the union’s Israel-related activity amounted to institutional antisemitic harassment failed in every particular. The tribunal held that a belief in the Zionist project is a political belief, not a protected characteristic, and criticised the attempt to litigate it.
The mirror of Miller: the first British case to hold that attachment to Zionism is politics rather than a protected characteristic.
Jewish organisations that reject the conflation
| Jewish Voice for Peace Describes itself as the largest anti-Zionist Jewish organisation in the world and “unequivocally reject[s] the conflation” of anti-Zionism with antisemitism; filed amicus briefs to the District Court of Massachusetts in June 2025. | United States |
| Independent Jewish Voices Adopted an explicitly anti-Zionist position by its steering committee on 15 January 2024, ratified by the membership in June 2024. | Canada |
| Jewish Council of Australia Submitted to Australia’s Royal Commission into Antisemitism and Social Cohesion in June 2026 that “definitions that treat criticism of Israel as antisemitic do not make Jews safer and actually make things worse” (§21.5). | Australia |
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The counter-evidence, stated at its strongest
- A Jewish Majority poll of February 2025 found that about 70 per cent of American Jews regard anti-Zionism as a form of antisemitism; the declaration’s claim to speak for a majority view is not invented.
- The ADL’s argument is that a rule distinguishing anti-Zionism from antisemitism “gives cover to antisemites” who have learned to phrase the old hostility in the new vocabulary.
- The IHRA definition has been adopted or endorsed by some 29 states and by both major British parties; it is the mainstream instrument, not a fringe one.
- In the one jurisdiction where the question has been litigated to appellate level, it has been decided the other way.