Each Gaza campaign, and what was found
Palestinian deaths by military operation, 2008–2026
Log scale. Hover for the period, civilian proportion, and legal finding.
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The verified breakdown
The report applies identical evidentiary standards to all actors. These are the verified Israeli figures.
7 October 2023: the documented breakdown
Israel's National Insurance Institute (Dec 2023), revised down from the initial IDF claim of ~1,400
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Hostages
What Israeli fire did on 7 October
The Hannibal Directive authorises lethal force to stop Israelis being taken captive, including force against the captives. It was formulated in 1986, rescinded in 2016, and reactivated on the morning of 7 October 2023.
What Israeli fire did on 7 October
Every bar is a documented count from the Israeli record — Haaretz, Channel 12, the IDF’s own statement. The grey bar at nought is the number of autopsies establishing which weapon killed each victim.
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Israelis killed by Israeli fire on 7 October
Not established, and deliberately so. Without autopsies or an investigation, the share of the 1,139 dead killed by the IDF rather than by Hamas cannot be stated. The National Insurance Institute puts the total at 1,139: Revised down from the initial claim of about 1,400.
- In February 2026, Channel 12 aired footage from the Israeli Police national command centre in which a senior officer calls for the directive explicitly — '(Strike) Gaza. Break it all apart. Along with the soldiers who got abducted' — after which Itamar Ben-Gvir enters the room and orders the cameras stopped.
- The figures plotted are incidents and counts, not a casualty breakdown: the breakdown does not exist because the investigation that would produce it was refused.
- This section does not diminish what Hamas did on 7 October, which the report treats as war crimes in its own Part XVIII. It establishes that the casualty figure used to justify what followed has never been disaggregated by who fired.
The policy of keeping Hamas funded
Successive Israeli governments treated a strong Hamas in Gaza as the guarantee against a Palestinian state. The record is Israeli: the Wall Street Journal, Haaretz, the Shin Bet's own investigation, and Netanyahu in his own words.
The policy of keeping Hamas funded
The bars are the documented monthly rate of $15 million annualised, not a published total; they are drawn dashed for that reason, and the 2023 bar is a part year. A pin marks a year in which something is on the record beyond the money.
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The record, in order
- 1982 — Israel's military governor funds the network
Brigadier General Yitzhak Segev, military governor of Gaza in the early 1980s, said he had personally funded the Islamist welfare network that became Hamas, as a counterweight to the secular PLO (Wall Street Journal, 24 January 2009). - 2012 — Netanyahu to Dan Margalit
It was important to keep Hamas strong as a counterweight to the Palestinian Authority (Israel Hayom, December 2012). - 2018 — The suitcases begin
Netanyahu's government approves monthly Qatari cash payments of $15 million and more, hand-delivered through Rafah with explicit Israeli approval. - 2019 — Netanyahu states the strategy
To his Likud Knesset members, March 2019: 'Anyone who wants to thwart the establishment of a Palestinian state has to support bolstering Hamas and transferring money to Hamas.' Ehud Barak confirmed the strategy was to keep Hamas 'alive and kicking'. - 2023 — Israel asks Qatar to increase the funding
September 2023, one month before the 7 October attack, following Hamas threats of escalation (Haaretz, January 2026; corroborated by Ynet and the Times of Israel). - 2023 — The warnings reach Netanyahu, and the policy does not change
Sinwar's plan for a 'zilzal' ('earthquake') was relayed to the Shin Bet on 15 September 2023, and UAE President Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed telephoned Netanyahu directly roughly ten days before 7 October to warn that Hamas was preparing a 'major operation' (Haaretz, 8 September 2026, from the book by Shlomi Eldar and Ruti Yuval). Netanyahu's office calls the report an 'absolute lie'; the UAE has not denied the call; former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett says he knew for a fact the report is true. Netanyahu did not raise the call at the 1 October 2023 security discussion, and the Shin Bet chief and the IDF Chief of Staff both say they were never told of it. The funding request and the warnings fall in the same month; the published record does not fix their order, and the policy was not reversed after the warnings arrived. - 2025 — The Shin Bet's own finding
4 March 2025: the Shin Bet's internal investigation found Qatari funds reaching Hamas's military wing, through a pipeline that circumvented Israeli civilian-aid oversight, were among the factors that enabled preparation for 7 October. The probe flagged Netanyahu's facilitation of the funding and his opposition to operations against senior Hamas leaders. Qatar disputes the characterisation, stating no funds reached Hamas's political or military wing.
The record states monthly Qatari cash payments of $15 million and more, hand-delivered through the Rafah crossing with explicit Israeli government approval, continuing for years from 2018. The yearly bars are that monthly rate annualised — the rate is documented, the totals are this dashboard's arithmetic, and the true figure is higher because the record says '$15 million+'.
Qatar's position is recorded alongside the Shin Bet's: it states that no funds reached Hamas's political or military wing.
Three systems, disclosed by the officers who operated them
Three systems, disclosed by the Israeli intelligence officers who operated them: one that lists people, one that lists buildings, and one that waits until the person is inside his own house.
The AI targeting systems
Log scale. The four rows share one unit — human beings — which is why they can sit on one axis. The dashed bar is the error rate applied to the list size: both figures are the investigation’s, the multiplication is this dashboard’s.
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The three systems
- Lavender — Lists people
Officers were given sweeping authorisation to adopt the system's kill lists with no requirement to verify its reasoning. - Habsora ("The Gospel") — Lists buildings
Identifies structures alleged to serve a military function and generates high-volume bombing target lists. - Where's Daddy? — Waits for the house
Tracks a targeted individual to his family home and enables the strike when he is inside it, which guarantees the deaths of the spouse, the children and the neighbours.
Officers spent as little as twenty seconds on a target before authorising a bombing, primarily to confirm the target was male.
- The systems were documented by Israeli intelligence officers speaking to +972 Magazine, not by the targets or their families.
- The Lieber Institute at West Point and multiple international law scholars have raised whether AI targeting used in this manner inherently violates the principles of distinction and proportionality.
Who investigated, and what each of them found
The accusation is made in one direction and established in the other. These are the bodies that investigated, and what each of them concluded.
Human shields: who found what
One row per investigating body, one column per allegation. A blank cell means that body did not address that column in this record — not that it cleared the conduct. Hover for the finding.
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- Rows marked 'not assessed' mean the body did not address that column in the material this record carries, not that it cleared the conduct.
- Even fully accepted, the human-shields argument does not suspend the attacking force's obligations: Additional Protocol I Article 51(5)(b) and Article 57 bind regardless of the defender's conduct.
- The state making the human-shields argument has been found by its own Supreme Court to have practised human shielding for two decades.
What was destroyed, and when
Proportion of each category destroyed or damaged, Oct 2023 – May 2026.
Destruction accumulating month by month
Cumulative counts per category over 36 months. Drag to rotate.
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Two further bodies of documented data
Starvation and siege
Log scale.
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Detention
Log scale.
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Forty-four years of the same doctrine
The Dahiya Doctrine is not an inference drawn by critics. It was set out by Major General Gadi Eisenkot, later IDF Chief of Staff, after the 2006 war: "What happened in the Dahiya quarter of Beirut in 2006 will happen in every village from which Israel is fired on… We will apply disproportionate force on it… From our standpoint, these are not civilian villages, they are military bases." What follows is the record of its application.
Lebanese killed and injured, by episode, 1982–2026
Log scale: the episodes run from 42 killed to 4,321, and a linear axis would flatten everything below the 2026 campaign. Hover for the date, the injured and displaced counts where they exist, and the finding.
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- The 1982 figure is a range because the killing was carried out by allied militias inside camps Israeli forces had surrounded, and no complete count was ever taken. The chart plots the low end of the documented range.
- The 2024 and 2026 tolls are the Lebanese health ministry's own counts, published contemporaneously.
- The Lemkin Institute for Genocide Prevention issued a Red Flag Alert, "Israel in Lebanon", in March 2026, after Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich said Beirut's Dahiyeh would "soon resemble Khan Younis".
Operations on other states' territory
In three calendar years, Israel conducted offensive military operations on the sovereign territory of at least four states: Lebanon, Syria, Yemen and Iran. Under Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, members shall refrain from the use of force against the territorial integrity of any state; under Article 51 the only exception is self-defence against an armed attack. Almost none of what follows was authorised by the Security Council.
Military operations on the sovereign territory of other states, 1967–2026
Each point is one documented operation; the size is the death toll where one has been published, and the smallest hollow points are operations with no published toll rather than operations with no dead. Diamonds mark a strike attributed to the United States rather than to Israel. Drag the slider to open out the last three years, which hold most of the record.
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- Symbol size is the documented death toll where one exists; events with no published toll are drawn at the minimum size rather than omitted.
- The Minab strike is attributed by the United States' own preliminary inquiry to US forces, and is marked accordingly. The report does not exempt US or Israeli conduct against Iranian civilians from the standards it applies to Israeli conduct against Palestinian civilians.
- The legal characterisation the report reaches: operations conducted without Security Council authorisation and beyond any defensible reading of Article 51 constitute acts of aggression under Article 8 bis of the Rome Statute.