Seventy-eight years of the death toll, and the holes in it
Everything else on this dashboard runs on a daily or monthly series that begins in October 2023. This block carries the periods before it. No continuous Palestinian death register has ever existed, so the record is assembled from separate bodies of work — a contemporaneous Palestinian enumeration of 1948, B'Tselem's case-by-case database from 1987, OCHA's monitoring from 2005, the Gaza Ministry of Health register from 2023 — each with its own definitions, geography and start date.
Palestinians killed, by documented period
Log scale. Amber: periods documented by a named organisation. Grey: an overlapping or partial series. Red: the current war. Violet, hatched: no organisation published a figure, so one is constructed here from adjacent counts — the arithmetic is set out in the table, and the estimate is never added to the documented running total.
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The documented running total, against the only cumulative figure that exists
Bars: deaths added in each period that can be counted without double counting. Amber line: the running total. Blue dashed line: the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics figure for the whole period since 1948.
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Every figure below carries the organisation that produced it and the method it used. Where no organisation published a figure, the row carries a constructed estimate instead: it is labelled as an estimate, shown with its low and high bounds, set out with the components it was built from, and excluded from the documented running total. The blocks are not additive with one another unless marked as counted, because several of the series overlap in time and none of them count the same population.
Treat every number here as a floor. Undercounting is structural: bodies never recovered, deaths in detention never recorded, indirect deaths from siege and the destruction of the health system, and twenty years of occupation for which no organisation was systematically counting at all.
Three of the nine periods have no published figure at all, and they span 1967–1987 and 1993–2000 — twenty-seven years. The absence is itself a finding: the record is thinnest exactly where there was no occupying-power obligation to publish, no Palestinian state to count, and no international monitoring mission in place. Rather than leave the three rows empty, each carries a constructed estimate with its arithmetic shown in full, marked as an estimate wherever it appears and never added to the documented running total.
136,000 — Palestinians killed since 1948
Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (Dr Ola Awad), World Refugee Day report, June 2024
The only cumulative figure published by the Palestinian statistical authority. It was issued in June 2024, when the Gaza toll stood near 37,000, so it implies roughly 99,000 deaths across 1948–2023 — far more than the individually documented periods below sum to. PCBS has not published the period-by-period basis for it, so it cannot be reconciled line by line with the blocks in this table. It is shown as an anchor, not as a total.
What happens to a complaint
What happens to a complaint about a soldier killing or injuring a Palestinian, from the Israeli organisation that follows every one of them through the Israeli military justice system. Yesh Din has been tracking the funnel since 2003.
Complaints, investigations and indictments, 2016–2024
Every stage as a share of the complaints that started it.
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The same funnel, four ways
| Period | Complaints | Investigated | Indicted |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2016–2024 22.7% of complaints produced a criminal investigation. 0.9% produced an indictment. |
2,427 | 552 22.7% |
23 0.9% |
| 2017–2021 409 of the 1,260 cases concerned a killing. 21.4% were investigated. Eleven indictments were filed in total, three of them for a killing — 0.87% of cases. |
1,260 | 248 19.7% |
11 0.9% |
| 2018–2022 30% investigated, the highest investigation rate in the series, and still a 1.5% prosecution rate. The thirteen indictments covered 29 soldiers, and exactly one of them was for a killing. |
862 | 258 29.9% |
13 1.5% |
This table is wider than the screen — scroll it sideways to see the rest.
- The funnel is not a backlog. Most complaints are closed without a criminal investigation ever being opened, so the case never enters the system that could convict anyone.
- This matters legally, not just morally. Complementarity under the Rome Statute means the International Criminal Court may act only where the state is unwilling or unable genuinely to investigate. A 0.9% indictment rate over nine years is the evidentiary basis for that finding, produced by an Israeli organisation from Israeli military records.
- Yesh Din's figures cover soldiers only. Israeli civilians who attack Palestinians in the West Bank are handled by the Israel Police, whose own closure rates over the same period are of the same order.
The continuous mechanism
Killing is the most visible part of the record and the smallest part of it by number. Dispossession is the continuous mechanism, and it runs through every period above without a break.
People displaced and structures demolished, 1948–2026
Log scale. Blue: people displaced. Amber: homes and structures demolished.
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- ICAHD's figure for the occupied territory is published in three versions — 26,000, 48,038 and 55,000 — which differ by date and by what counts as a structure, not by disagreement about the events. The highest is its February 2019 compilation and is the one shown here.
- ICAHD's own methodological warning applies to every figure in this block: neither Israel nor OCHA keeps a count of home demolitions separately from the demolition of structures, so barns, animal pens, cisterns and fencing are inside the same totals. ICAHD also states that it is still investigating demolitions carried out between 1967 and 1982, before the Civil Administration began keeping records.
- Demolition is administrative, not military. The stated ground in the large majority of cases is building without an Israeli permit, in a permit system that almost never issues one to a Palestinian while approving thousands of settlement housing units over the same period.
Since 1967, without charge
The occupation's other continuous instrument. Israel has held Palestinians under military order in the occupied territory since 1967, and administrative detention — indefinite imprisonment on secret evidence, without charge or trial — has been available to it throughout.
Palestinians held in administrative detention, at each documented snapshot
Detention without charge, without trial, and on evidence the detainee may not see. The orders are renewable without limit.
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The three laws
| Article 285, Military Order 1651 West Bank Six-month detention orders, renewable without limit, on evidence neither the detainee nor their lawyer may see. |
| Internment of Unlawful Combatants Law Gaza residents, since 2005 Indefinite detention outside the military order framework. |
| Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law Israeli citizens The same power inside Israel. Over the entire history of its use, nine Israeli settlers have been held under administrative detention. |
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- Administrative detention is not a charge that has yet to be brought. It is a procedure that replaces charge: the detainee is not told the evidence, cannot answer it, and the order is renewable indefinitely.
- Children are inside these figures. Israel is the only state in the world that systematically prosecutes children in military courts, at roughly 500 to 700 cases a year before the war and 370 child prisoners held as of the October 2025 snapshot.
- 98 Palestinians have died in Israeli custody since October 2023, documented by Physicians for Human Rights–Israel.