Who supplies the war
No state sustains a war of this scale alone. The weapons, the money and the diplomatic cover are supplied, and every supplier is named in the public record. This is the ledger of who supplies what — and of who has stopped.
Where Israel's major arms imports come from, 2020–2024
Share of major conventional arms deliveries. Two states account for ninety-nine per cent of them.
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The three suppliers
| United States — 66% Two thirds of Israel's major conventional arms imports. The relationship is not commercial in the ordinary sense: most of it is paid for with United States grant money, under the Foreign Military Financing programme, and spent back in the United States defence industry. |
| Germany — 33% One third — the second largest supplier, and the largest in Europe. Germany approved roughly €326 million in arms exports to Israel in 2023, about ten times the 2022 figure. Berlin announced a partial suspension in August 2025 and lifted it in November 2025. |
| Italy — 0.6% Italy suspended new export licences in October 2023 but continued deliveries under contracts signed before that date. |
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SIPRI measures deliveries of major conventional weapons, not components, spare parts or ammunition. The F-35 programme in particular is supplied through a global parts pool to which several states contribute without any bilateral licence appearing in their own figures — the mechanism the United Kingdom relied on when it suspended some direct licences in September 2024.
United States bilateral aid to Israel, cumulative
Each bar is a published cumulative total at the date stated. The last bar is the same aid adjusted for inflation, which is the honest comparison across eighty years.
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The annual flows, and the war supplementals
The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding fixed $3.8 billion a year to 2028. The war added more in one year than the Memorandum provides in four.
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- Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of United States foreign assistance since the Second World War.
- United States law already contains the instruments that would restrict this. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act bars security assistance to any government engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights; the Leahy Laws bar assistance to units credibly implicated in such violations; and Section 620I bars assistance to any country that restricts the delivery of United States humanitarian aid. None has been applied.
- The aid figures are the published cumulative totals at three dates, not an annual series. The Congressional Research Service does not publish a continuous machine-readable annual table.
What each government authorised, and when
SIPRI measures deliveries of major conventional weapons. The supplying states publish something different, and more specific: what they authorised, when, and to what value. Those three national records are set out here as each government reported them, including the German ministry's answer to a parliamentary question, the US congressional and Costs of War tallies, and the UK's own count of the licences it suspended against the ones it left in force.
German arms export licences to Israel, by year
The bar for 2022 is derived from the report's "tenfold increase" wording rather than separately published, and is drawn dashed for that reason. The 2026 bar is half a year. Chancellor Friedrich Merz suspended export licences for military equipment potentially usable in Gaza — the first German arms restriction on Israel. Berlin lifted it on 24 November 2025, citing the October 2025 ceasefire as having "stabilised". Amnesty International called the lifting "reckless, unlawful and risks complicity in Israel's international crimes".
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What the €800 million bought
| ~66% | INS Drakon, a Dolphin II-class submarine built by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems Roughly two-thirds of the approved value. The vessel departed Kiel in early September 2026 for the region. |
| ~20% | German–Israeli defence-industry cooperation benefiting the German armed forces About one fifth of the approved value. |
| ~14% | Small arms, ammunition, explosives and drones The remainder. |
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German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, answer to a parliamentary inquiry by the Left Party, September 2026; reported by Der Spiegel via Anadolu Agency, and Globes
- The fourfold surge in the six months after the embargo was lifted shows the embargo functioned as a pause, not a reversal: German supply resumed at a higher rate than at any point before it was imposed.
- The Left Party, whose parliamentary question produced the figures, accused Berlin of "unlimited double standards".
- Nicaragua's case against Germany for complicity in genocide, filed at the ICJ in April 2024, was still pending when the 2026 approvals were disclosed.
United States arms to Israel since 7 October 2023
The bars are separate announcements and standing case values; they overlap in scope and do not sum. The two dashed lines are the published totals: what Congress enacted, and what the Costs of War project counts including transfers, foreign military sales and emergency authority.
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What the United Kingdom suspended, and what it left in force
Roughly 30 of 350 extant export licences suspended over the risk of breaches of international humanitarian law. The remainder, including the disputed exemption for F-35 components, were left intact.
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What the suspension left untouched
| 15% — Share of every F-35 built globally that is made by BAE Systems in the UK The aircraft used against Gaza and Beirut. The component exemption survived a legal challenge: in June 2025 the High Court dismissed the case brought by Al-Haq and the Global Legal Action Network, accepting that UK parts enter a multilateral collaborative pool rather than being sold directly to Israel. |
| 600+ — RAF surveillance missions flown over Gaza Flown from Cyprus, with intelligence shared with Israel. |
| 60 — UK aircraft flown to Israel in the months after 7 October 2023 Matt Kennard for Declassified UK, May 2024. |
| 10+ — Military flights from RAF bases to Israel in the first six weeks of the Burnham premiership Eight Stratotankers from RAF Mildenhall between 24 July and 26 August 2026; an A400M Atlas from RAF Akrotiri into Tel Aviv on 26 August 2026; a US C-17 from RAF Lakenheath on 11 August 2026. Novara Media, 3 September 2026. |
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- Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband added a "double lock" on 8 September 2026 — a commitment to refuse future licence applications that materially contribute to the occupation — without extending the suspension to the F-35 exemption.
- Nearly three years into the war, the UK had still not moved to a full two-way arms embargo, the demand made since 2024 by the TUC, the Green Party, Humza Yousaf and the Palestinian Youth Movement Britain.
- In July 2025, while sitting in the cabinet licensing these exports, then-Health Secretary Wes Streeting wrote privately to Peter Mandelson that Israel was "committing war crimes before our eyes". He was appointed Defence Secretary on 20 July 2026.
Who has stopped, and who has not
Which states have restricted arms transfers to Israel since October 2023, and which have not.
Arms transfer restrictions by state, since October 2023
Green: halted. Amber: partial or court-ordered. Red: continuing without restriction. Hover for the measure and its date.
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- The legal position is not in doubt. Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions obliges every High Contracting Party to ensure respect for the Conventions; the Arms Trade Treaty, Article 6(3), prohibits any transfer where the state knows the arms would be used in war crimes; and the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 held that all states are under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful occupation.
- On 20 June 2025 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory published a report naming the corporate entities she found to be sustaining it, and recommending that states and companies sever those ties.
The settlement-business database, and what has moved
In 2016 the Human Rights Council instructed its own office to compile a database of businesses operating in the Israeli settlements. It is the only official list of its kind, and it has grown at every revision.
Businesses listed by the United Nations as operating in the settlements
Three releases in five years. The 2023 fall is not a reprieve: fifteen entities were removed because they stopped.
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What listing means
Listing is not an accusation of a crime. It records that the entity carries on one of ten activities the Human Rights Council identified as raising particular human rights concerns in the settlements — supply of equipment for demolition, services sustaining settlement maintenance, banking for settlement construction, use of natural resources, and the rest. Israeli settlements in the occupied territory are unlawful under Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a position the International Court of Justice restated on 19 July 2024.
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, database pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 31/36
- Divestment is not a boycott of a people. It is the withdrawal of investment from named commercial activity in territory an international court has held to be unlawfully occupied.
- The precedent is exact and recent: the same instruments — disclosure, listing, divestment, procurement bans — were used against apartheid South Africa, and the states that used them are in many cases the same states that now decline to.
One state against fourteen
The Security Council is the only United Nations organ whose decisions bind. Since 1972 the United States has used its permanent-member veto to stop draft resolutions concerning Israel more often than on any other subject in the Council's history.
Security Council drafts blocked since 7 October 2023
Each bar is the whole Council: green voted for, grey abstained, red is the single vote that stopped it.
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Before the war
| 10 Sep 1972 | The first. Document S/10784, on Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Syria. |
| 18 Feb 2011 | A draft declaring the settlements illegal — a position the United States itself held — vetoed 14 to 1. |
| 18 Dec 2017 | A draft on the status of Jerusalem, vetoed 14 to 1. |
| 10 May 2024 | Not a veto. Blocked at the Council, the membership question went to the General Assembly, which voted 143 to 9 with 25 abstentions to upgrade Palestine's rights and to ask the Council to reconsider. The Council did not. |
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- The pattern is the point. In every vote since November 2024 the tally has been fourteen to one: every other member of the Security Council, including every other permanent member and every American ally on the Council, voted for a ceasefire.
- General Assembly resolutions on the same question have passed repeatedly by margins above 120 votes. They are not binding. That is the design the veto protects.
Thirty-seven years in one direction
Recognition of the State of Palestine has moved in one direction for thirty-seven years, and it accelerated sharply in 2024 and 2025.
UN member states recognising the State of Palestine, 1988–2026
A step line: each step is a documented wave of recognitions. The dashed line is all 193 member states.
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Among the thirty-six: the United States, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece, Switzerland, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, North Macedonia, Panama, Cameroon, Eritrea, and a group of Pacific microstates — Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu — whose votes at the General Assembly are reliably aligned with Washington.
- Recognition is a legal act with consequences: it establishes the recognising state's position that Palestine satisfies the criteria of statehood, and it opens treaty relations, diplomatic representation and standing before international bodies.
- It is also the measure on which the gap between governments and their populations is widest. The states that continue to withhold recognition are, with few exceptions, the states that continue to supply the weapons.