Flag of Palestine The Documented Record Israel & the Occupied Territories · 1917–2026
Casualty data 10 September 2026
This is a static snapshot, generated on 13 September 2026 so that this section of the record can be read, linked and indexed without JavaScript. The charts, maps, filters and search are in the interactive version of this page.
Complicity

Who supplies the war

No state sustains a war of this scale alone. The weapons, the money and the diplomatic cover are supplied, and every supplier is named in the public record. This is the ledger of who supplies what — and of who has stopped.

Where Israel's major arms imports come from, 2020–2024

Share of major conventional arms deliveries. Two states account for ninety-nine per cent of them.

SIPRI

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The three suppliers

United States — 66%
Two thirds of Israel's major conventional arms imports. The relationship is not commercial in the ordinary sense: most of it is paid for with United States grant money, under the Foreign Military Financing programme, and spent back in the United States defence industry.
Germany — 33%
One third — the second largest supplier, and the largest in Europe. Germany approved roughly €326 million in arms exports to Israel in 2023, about ten times the 2022 figure. Berlin announced a partial suspension in August 2025 and lifted it in November 2025.
Italy — 0.6%
Italy suspended new export licences in October 2023 but continued deliveries under contracts signed before that date.

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SIPRI measures deliveries of major conventional weapons, not components, spare parts or ammunition. The F-35 programme in particular is supplied through a global parts pool to which several states contribute without any bilateral licence appearing in their own figures — the mechanism the United Kingdom relied on when it suspended some direct licences in September 2024.

United States bilateral aid to Israel, cumulative

Each bar is a published cumulative total at the date stated. The last bar is the same aid adjusted for inflation, which is the honest comparison across eighty years.

Congressional Research Service; Costs of War

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The annual flows, and the war supplementals

The 2016 Memorandum of Understanding fixed $3.8 billion a year to 2028. The war added more in one year than the Memorandum provides in four.

Congressional Research Service; Public Law 118-50

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150$bn
Cumulative bilateral aid, 1946 to February 2022
Congressional Research Service, RL33222, February 2022
158.7$bn
Cumulative bilateral aid, to March 2023
Congressional Research Service, RL33222, March 2023
174$bn
Cumulative bilateral aid, latest published
Congressional Research Service, RL33222, current edition
317.9$bn
The same aid adjusted for inflation, 1959–2024
Costs of War Project, Brown University, October 2024
  • Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of United States foreign assistance since the Second World War.
  • United States law already contains the instruments that would restrict this. Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act bars security assistance to any government engaged in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally recognised human rights; the Leahy Laws bar assistance to units credibly implicated in such violations; and Section 620I bars assistance to any country that restricts the delivery of United States humanitarian aid. None has been applied.
  • The aid figures are the published cumulative totals at three dates, not an annual series. The Congressional Research Service does not publish a continuous machine-readable annual table.
The suppliers' own numbers

What each government authorised, and when

SIPRI measures deliveries of major conventional weapons. The supplying states publish something different, and more specific: what they authorised, when, and to what value. Those three national records are set out here as each government reported them, including the German ministry's answer to a parliamentary question, the US congressional and Costs of War tallies, and the UK's own count of the licences it suspended against the ones it left in force.

German arms export licences to Israel, by year

The bar for 2022 is derived from the report's "tenfold increase" wording rather than separately published, and is drawn dashed for that reason. The 2026 bar is half a year. Chancellor Friedrich Merz suspended export licences for military equipment potentially usable in Gaza — the first German arms restriction on Israel. Berlin lifted it on 24 November 2025, citing the October 2025 ceasefire as having "stabilised". Amnesty International called the lifting "reckless, unlawful and risks complicity in Israel's international crimes".

§13.4

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What the €800 million bought

~66% INS Drakon, a Dolphin II-class submarine built by ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems
Roughly two-thirds of the approved value. The vessel departed Kiel in early September 2026 for the region.
~20% German–Israeli defence-industry cooperation benefiting the German armed forces
About one fifth of the approved value.
~14% Small arms, ammunition, explosives and drones
The remainder.

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German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, answer to a parliamentary inquiry by the Left Party, September 2026; reported by Der Spiegel via Anadolu Agency, and Globes

  • The fourfold surge in the six months after the embargo was lifted shows the embargo functioned as a pause, not a reversal: German supply resumed at a higher rate than at any point before it was imposed.
  • The Left Party, whose parliamentary question produced the figures, accused Berlin of "unlimited double standards".
  • Nicaragua's case against Germany for complicity in genocide, filed at the ICJ in April 2024, was still pending when the 2026 approvals were disclosed.

United States arms to Israel since 7 October 2023

The bars are separate announcements and standing case values; they overlap in scope and do not sum. The two dashed lines are the published totals: what Congress enacted, and what the Costs of War project counts including transfers, foreign military sales and emergency authority.

§13.2

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16.3$bn
Enacted by US legislation since 7 October 2023
US Congress, Library of Congress
21.7$bn
All military aid, October 2023 to September 2025, including transfers, foreign military sales and emergency authority
Brown University Costs of War, through September 2025

What the United Kingdom suspended, and what it left in force

Roughly 30 of 350 extant export licences suspended over the risk of breaches of international humanitarian law. The remainder, including the disputed exemption for F-35 components, were left intact.

§13.3, §15.2

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What the suspension left untouched

15% — Share of every F-35 built globally that is made by BAE Systems in the UK
The aircraft used against Gaza and Beirut. The component exemption survived a legal challenge: in June 2025 the High Court dismissed the case brought by Al-Haq and the Global Legal Action Network, accepting that UK parts enter a multilateral collaborative pool rather than being sold directly to Israel.
600+ — RAF surveillance missions flown over Gaza
Flown from Cyprus, with intelligence shared with Israel.
60 — UK aircraft flown to Israel in the months after 7 October 2023
Matt Kennard for Declassified UK, May 2024.
10+ — Military flights from RAF bases to Israel in the first six weeks of the Burnham premiership
Eight Stratotankers from RAF Mildenhall between 24 July and 26 August 2026; an A400M Atlas from RAF Akrotiri into Tel Aviv on 26 August 2026; a US C-17 from RAF Lakenheath on 11 August 2026. Novara Media, 3 September 2026.

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  • Foreign Secretary Ed Miliband added a "double lock" on 8 September 2026 — a commitment to refuse future licence applications that materially contribute to the occupation — without extending the suspension to the F-35 exemption.
  • Nearly three years into the war, the UK had still not moved to a full two-way arms embargo, the demand made since 2024 by the TUC, the Green Party, Humza Yousaf and the Palestinian Youth Movement Britain.
  • In July 2025, while sitting in the cabinet licensing these exports, then-Health Secretary Wes Streeting wrote privately to Peter Mandelson that Israel was "committing war crimes before our eyes". He was appointed Defence Secretary on 20 July 2026.
The embargo tracker

Who has stopped, and who has not

Which states have restricted arms transfers to Israel since October 2023, and which have not.

Arms transfer restrictions by state, since October 2023

Green: halted. Amber: partial or court-ordered. Red: continuing without restriction. Hover for the measure and its date.

National export-licensing records; court judgments

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StateStatusDateMeasure
Turkey halted May 2024 Suspended all trade with Israel, worth about $7 billion a year, pending unimpeded aid access to Gaza.
Slovenia halted August 2024 Banned the import, export and transit of arms to and from Israel — the first European Union member state to impose a full arms ban.
Spain halted October 2023, formalised September 2025 Halted arms sales from the start of the war and made the embargo law by royal decree in September 2025, also barring ships and aircraft carrying fuel or arms for Israel from Spanish ports and airspace.
Colombia halted May 2024 Broke diplomatic relations and halted coal exports, which had supplied a substantial share of Israel's thermal coal.
Netherlands partial February 2024 The Hague Court of Appeal ordered the state to stop exporting F-35 parts to Israel, finding a clear risk of serious violations of international humanitarian law. The government appealed.
Belgium partial October 2023 The Walloon and Flemish regions, which control export licensing, suspended licences to Israel; Wallonia's suspension was later confirmed by court.
Canada partial September 2024 Suspended about thirty existing permits and halted new ones, while goods continued to reach Israel indirectly through United States supply chains.
Italy partial October 2023 Suspended new licences but continued deliveries under contracts already signed.
United Kingdom partial September 2024 Suspended about 30 of roughly 350 licences on the grounds of a clear risk of serious violation of international humanitarian law, while expressly exempting F-35 components supplied into the global parts pool.
Germany continuing November 2025 The second largest supplier. Announced a partial suspension of weapons usable in Gaza in August 2025 and lifted it in November 2025.
United States continuing No restriction. Two thirds of supply, and the veto that has blocked every binding Security Council measure.

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  • The legal position is not in doubt. Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions obliges every High Contracting Party to ensure respect for the Conventions; the Arms Trade Treaty, Article 6(3), prohibits any transfer where the state knows the arms would be used in war crimes; and the International Court of Justice's advisory opinion of 19 July 2024 held that all states are under an obligation not to render aid or assistance in maintaining the unlawful occupation.
  • On 20 June 2025 the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the occupied Palestinian territory published a report naming the corporate entities she found to be sustaining it, and recommending that states and companies sever those ties.
Divestment

The settlement-business database, and what has moved

In 2016 the Human Rights Council instructed its own office to compile a database of businesses operating in the Israeli settlements. It is the only official list of its kind, and it has grown at every revision.

Businesses listed by the United Nations as operating in the settlements

Three releases in five years. The 2023 fall is not a reprieve: fifteen entities were removed because they stopped.

OHCHR, HRC resolution 31/36

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What listing means

Listing is not an accusation of a crime. It records that the entity carries on one of ten activities the Human Rights Council identified as raising particular human rights concerns in the settlements — supply of equipment for demolition, services sustaining settlement maintenance, banking for settlement construction, use of natural resources, and the rest. Israeli settlements in the occupied territory are unlawful under Article 49(6) of the Fourth Geneva Convention, a position the International Court of Justice restated on 19 July 2024.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, database pursuant to Human Rights Council resolution 31/36

InstitutionDateAction
Norges Bank Investment ManagementAugust 2025 Norway's sovereign wealth fund, the largest in the world at about $1.9 trillion. In August 2025 it divested from eleven Israeli companies and cut its Israeli holdings from 61 companies to 23, after disclosure that it held a stake in a jet-engine maker servicing Israeli fighter aircraft.
KLPJune 2024 Norway's largest pension company sold its stake in Caterpillar, finding an unacceptable risk that the company's bulldozers were used in violations of international law in the occupied territory.
PFZWJanuary 2025 The Dutch healthcare pension fund, about €238 billion, divested from Israeli government bonds and from companies tied to the occupation.
AkademikerPension2024 The Danish pension fund excluded Israeli banks financing settlement construction.
Trinity College DublinMay 2024 Divested from Israeli companies on the United Nations database after a student encampment — the first university in Ireland to do so.
Ireland, Occupied Territories Bill2024–2025 Legislation to ban trade in goods and services originating in the settlements, revived after the International Court of Justice advisory opinion of July 2024.

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  • Divestment is not a boycott of a people. It is the withdrawal of investment from named commercial activity in territory an international court has held to be unlawfully occupied.
  • The precedent is exact and recent: the same instruments — disclosure, listing, divestment, procurement bans — were used against apartheid South Africa, and the states that used them are in many cases the same states that now decline to.
The veto wall

One state against fourteen

The Security Council is the only United Nations organ whose decisions bind. Since 1972 the United States has used its permanent-member veto to stop draft resolutions concerning Israel more often than on any other subject in the Council's history.

Security Council drafts blocked since 7 October 2023

Each bar is the whole Council: green voted for, grey abstained, red is the single vote that stopped it.

UN Security Council records

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49
United States vetoes of draft resolutions on Israel and Palestine
Since the first on 10 September 1972, document S/10784, on a draft concerning Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Syria. Counts vary between 45 and 53 depending on whether blocked presidential statements and unpublished drafts are included.
55%
Share of all United States vetoes ever cast
More than half of every veto the United States has cast since 1945 has concerned Israel.
7
Vetoes since 7 October 2023
Six of them on drafts calling for a ceasefire or humanitarian access, and one on Palestinian membership of the United Nations.
DateDraft resolutionForAbstainedAgainst
18 Oct 2023 Brazil's draft: humanitarian pauses, aid access, condemnation of all violence against civilians 122 1 — United States
8 Dec 2023 United Arab Emirates draft: immediate humanitarian ceasefire, invoked under Article 99 by the Secretary-General 131 1 — United States
20 Feb 2024 Algeria's draft: immediate humanitarian ceasefire, rejection of forcible displacement 131 1 — United States
18 Apr 2024 Algeria's draft: recommending Palestine for full United Nations membership 122 1 — United States
20 Nov 2024 The ten elected members' draft: immediate, unconditional and permanent ceasefire 140 1 — United States
4 Jun 2025 The ten elected members' draft: immediate ceasefire, unrestricted aid, release of hostages 140 1 — United States
18 Sep 2025 The ten elected members' draft: immediate and unconditional ceasefire 140 1 — United States

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Before the war

10 Sep 1972The first. Document S/10784, on Israeli attacks in Lebanon and Syria.
18 Feb 2011A draft declaring the settlements illegal — a position the United States itself held — vetoed 14 to 1.
18 Dec 2017A draft on the status of Jerusalem, vetoed 14 to 1.
10 May 2024Not a veto. Blocked at the Council, the membership question went to the General Assembly, which voted 143 to 9 with 25 abstentions to upgrade Palestine's rights and to ask the Council to reconsider. The Council did not.

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  • The pattern is the point. In every vote since November 2024 the tally has been fourteen to one: every other member of the Security Council, including every other permanent member and every American ally on the Council, voted for a ceasefire.
  • General Assembly resolutions on the same question have passed repeatedly by margins above 120 votes. They are not binding. That is the design the veto protects.
Recognition

Thirty-seven years in one direction

Recognition of the State of Palestine has moved in one direction for thirty-seven years, and it accelerated sharply in 2024 and 2025.

UN member states recognising the State of Palestine, 1988–2026

A step line: each step is a documented wave of recognitions. The dashed line is all 193 member states.

UN records; national declarations

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157
States recognising the State of Palestine
of 193 states
36
States not recognising
of 193 states
14
G20 members recognising
of 19 states
YearMilestoneStates recognisingWhat happened
1988Declaration of Independence, Algiers 78Within weeks of the declaration of 15 November 1988, about 78 states had recognised the State of Palestine.
2011The Latin American wave 122Brazil, Argentina, Chile, Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru and others recognised in 2010 and 2011.
2012Non-member observer State 132On 29 November 2012 the General Assembly upgraded Palestine to non-member observer State by 138 votes to 9, with 41 abstentions.
2014Sweden 135The first European Union member in Western Europe to recognise while in government.
2024Spain, Ireland, Norway, Slovenia, Armenia 146Spain, Ireland and Norway recognised jointly on 28 May 2024; Slovenia followed on 4 June and Armenia on 21 June.
2025The United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, France and others 157In two days, 21 and 22 September 2025, eleven further states recognised, including four G7 members.

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Among the thirty-six: the United States, Germany, Italy, Japan, South Korea, the Netherlands, Austria, Greece, Switzerland, Croatia, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, North Macedonia, Panama, Cameroon, Eritrea, and a group of Pacific microstates — Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Samoa, Tonga and Tuvalu — whose votes at the General Assembly are reliably aligned with Washington.

  • Recognition is a legal act with consequences: it establishes the recognising state's position that Palestine satisfies the criteria of statehood, and it opens treaty relations, diplomatic representation and standing before international bodies.
  • It is also the measure on which the gap between governments and their populations is widest. The states that continue to withhold recognition are, with few exceptions, the states that continue to supply the weapons.